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HORIZONTAL DIVISIONS OF LAND.
Mr. Justice Blackstone defines an "estate" in land to be "such
an interest as the tenant hath therein." 2 B1. 103.
It is an interest in land. There can be no -estate" in purely
personal property. When we speak of personal estate, we do not
use the word in the sense in which it has become technical in the
law of realty.
. This term land includes not only the surface of the ground, but
the substance or body of the soil, usque ad mediam terrm, and all
accessions to the' soil, with the water and open space or air over
them, u8que ad ceum.
If a man, therefore, have a circular surface, the actual form of
the land of which he is proprietor is a cone, of which the centre
of the earth is the apex, and the circular surface of the earth, or
perhap~s a circular plane at an undefined distance above it, is the
base.
Except under local statutory regulations, or by force of laws or
.customs, such as those which in some states prevent aliens or cor-
porations from owning more than a certain amount of real estate,
there seems to be no limit to the quantity of land which a citizen
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may possess, nor to the extent to which, when he becomes the
owner, he may divide and subdivide, for purposes of sale.
An estate in a square foot of ground is clothed with all the
technical characteristics of an estate in a hundred acres.
Primdfacie when a man owns the surface he owns all accessions
to it, such as trees, houses and other structures, and his proprietor-
ship extenas usque ad mediam terrce and usque ad aealum. If a
man buy land at sheriff's sale or otherwise, by the description of
a lot, bounded by certain lines, without mentioning buildings or
any other thing, structures of any number and value, and mines
of any depth, will pass to him by mere operation of law as incidents
or appurtenances to his lot.
But this is only the result of a prima facies or presumption, not
of any legal impossibility of severing the house from the land, or
one story of it from another, or mines from the surface. Just as
there may be different owners of different cones, there may be dif-
ferent owners of different strata of the same cone. Different pro-
prietorships of land may be bounded or defined by horizontal as
well as perpendicular lines. But such departures from the ordi-
nary rule or custom of ownership require clear expression.
And first, as to the space or column of air over a man's soil.
Is it his closb, or is his ownership of it peculiar?
There is no doubt that if one owner erects or constructs some-
thing on his own soil, which overhangs his neighbor, he is liable in
an action. This shows the right of the proprietor of the soil. But
there has been a question as to the form of his action; and the
discussion to which this question has led shows that distinctions
must be made between his technical relation to the soil and the
air.
If one man invades another's soil, trespass vi it armi is the
remedy. The surface of the ground is a tenement, something cor-
poreal, the possession of which will admit of that action.
It appears, however, to have been held that for overhanging
another's land, the action must be on the case. In Pickering
vs. Reed, Lord ELLENBOROUGH said: cc I do not think it is a
trespass to interfere with the column of air superincumbent on the
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close. I once had occasion to rule upon the circuit that a man
who from the outside of a field discharged a gun into it, so as that
the shot must have struck the soil, was guilty of breaking and
entering it. A very learned judge who went the circuit with me,
at first doubted the decision, but I believe he afterwards approved
of it, and that it met with the general concurrence of those to whom
it was mentioned. But I am by no means prepared to say that
firing across a field in vacuo, no part of the contents touching it,
amounts to a clausum fregit. Nay, if this board overhanging the
plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an aeronaut is
liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, at the suit of
the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in the
course of his voyage. Whether the action may be maintained
cannot depend upon the length of time for which the superincum-
bent air is invaded. If any damage arises from the object which
overhangs the close, the remedy is by an action on the case." 4
Camp. 219.
It would seem from these remarks that, nothwithstanding the
maxim to which reference has been made, the position of this
space or column of air is peculiar; and we know of no case in
which an effort has been made by grant or conveyance to sever it
from the soil and give an exclusive right in it, in the manner in
which, as we shall presently show, the herbage or mineral strata
may be severed from the body'of the ground.
An exclusive right of fishery, also, in the water which rests
upon or flows over a man's soil is a peculiar right, and some of the
same views which apply to the air apply to the water. In Hfart
vs. Hill, it was held that where there was a direct interruption of
one who had an exclusive right of fishery, while actually fishing,
trespass would lie, but the court seemed to think case the ordinary
remedy for interruption of a fishery. 1 Whart. 124.
1 Where, however, one has an exclusive right to an oyster-bed, it
would seem that trespass will lie though there be a common or free
fishery over it.
In Fleet vs. .Uageman, 14 Wend. 42, (see also Decker vs. Fisher,
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4 Barb. 592,) this doctrine was distinctly laid down, but was not
supported, as we think it might well have been, by the citation of
cases to some of which we shall presently refer, and which, by
analogy, would seem to establish that such a right is a freehold,-
a tenement. Perhaps, however, owing to the mode in which the
right arose, the question of the character of the interest may be
considered as not having been fully presented.
We now come to the artificial structures upon or accessions to
the soil.
In the Touchstone we are told that livery may be made of a
" chamber," p. 214; and Mr. Burton says, , So an upper chamber
may constitute a distinct tenement." § 549. In Erskine's Insti-
tutes of the Laws of Scotland, mention is made of rules which
become applicable "When a house is divided into different floors
or stories, each floor belonging to a different owner, which fre-
quently happens in the city of Edinburgh." Book II. tit. 9, § 11.
Similar authorities are to be found scattered through the books;
and we know of no reason why they are not applicable in this
country. It is true, land is more valuable, houses are more lofty,
and cities cover smaller areas, in proportion to their respective
populations, where these peculiar ownerships occur, than they do in
this country; but as our population increases we may adopt the
same habit.
It is manifest that if one person may own a distinct story or
chamber, there may be one owner of the land and another of the
-whole house upon it, as well as of any part of the house.
These authorities apply to houses and other artificial accessions
to the land. We now proceed to those which refer to the different
portions of the soil itself.
Mr. Burton says: "It may also be collected from the authori-
ties that, by special grant, the vesture or herbage of laud may
constitute an interest distinct from the body of the subjacent
earth, and yet capable of being defended by action of trespass
and recovered in ejectment; though it may be thought uncertain
whether such an interest lies in livery." § 1162. And Lord
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Coke, after declaring that a rent cannot issue out of an incorpo-
real, says, -But if a man demiseth the herbage or vesture of his
land, he may reserve a rent, for that the thing is maynorable, and
the lessor may distrain the cattle on the land." 47 a.
Some of the cases upon this subject are very curious indeed, and
are deserving of special reference. They suggest difficulties which
surround the well established division of hereditaments into cor--
poreal and incorporeal, and might lead us to reconsider it, if it
were safe to do so. The truth is, that many of the technical terms
and arrangements of legal science have become fixed and hardened
in imperfect stages of its development. But they are now too firm
and obstinate to be disturbed. To readjust them would make end-
less confusion with students, and controversy with those who will
admit nothing against the oracles of the law. It is one of the many
difficulties under which legal science labors, that we must carry
its history as well as its reason along with us, and when the latter
rebels, often coerce it into an awkward submission to the former.
At common law that was corporeal of which livery could be
made, and actual seisin had, and in respect of which trespass and
ejectment were the tenant's remedies. That of which livery could
not be made was said to lie in grant, and was called incorporeal.
When one had an estate in the land he was said to have a corpo-
real hereditament; when his estate was in a common or an ease-
ment upon or out of land, he was said to have an incorporeal here-
ditament.
In 1%e King vs. The Inhabitants of All Saints, a pauper whose
settlement was in controversy, had been allowed to take the sand
and gravel from the bed of a river exclusively, on certain terms.
His settlement depended on the question whetler this right was a
"tenement" or not. The court held that it was. 5 M. & S. 90.
Lord Coke says, " So if a man grant to another to dig turves in
his land, and to carry them at his will and pleasure, the land shall
not passe, because but part of the profit is given, for trees, mines,
&c., shall not passe; but if a man seised of lands in fee, by his
deed granteth to another the profit of those lands to have and to
hold to him and his heirs, and maketh the livery secundum formam
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doni, the whole land itself doth passe; for what is the land but the
profits thereof: for thereby vesture, herbage, trees, mines and all
whatsoever parcel of that land doth passe." And Mr. Burton
says, "cA grant of the profits of land carries the land itself."
§547.
And Lord Coke further says, " By the grant of a boillourie of
salt it is said that the soil shall passe, for it is the whole profit of
the soil." See also Earl of Bute vs. Grindall, 2 H. B1. 265."
It was upon this ground that the court, in the case of the pauper,
appear to have decided that his right amounted to a tenement.
He had exclusively in him the only profit of the bed of the river;
the only use to which it could be applied.
In The King vs. Tolpuddle, which was also a settlement case,
the pauper had rented twenty cows at so much per annum, and
agreed that they should pasture in certain fields for certain parts
of the year, exclusively. Lord Kenyon held that he had a tene-
ment, because he took by the mouths of his cattle the entire profits
of the soil, exclusively. ASHHURST, J., says, "During that time,
therefore, the pauper had a separate pernancy of the profits of
these fields, which is equal to a demise of the land itself." 4 T.
R. 675.
The case of Burt vs. Moore was a similar one, except that the
person, the character of whose right was in question, had the
exclusive right of pasture at all times. 5 T. R. 332.
The same decision was made in the case of a warren, where the
person had an exclusive right to take the herbage by the mouths
of rabbits, and where there was a lease of the fishery of a pond,
" with the spear, sedge, flags and rushes growing in and about the
same."
In these cases it was impliedly held, if not dxpressed, that
the right to the herbage carried with it the right to so much of the
- soil as was necessary to support the herbage, and this of course
added to the dignity of the right.
In Stanley vs. Whiite, it seems to have. been held that a grant
of an exclusive right to trees which were growing, and were to
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continue to grow, passed the soil necessary for their support. 14
East 342.
These cases seem to have been decided in favor of the dignity
of the estate of the person who had this paramount or entire use
of the profits of the soil, on the ground of its being exclusive.
This exclusiveness was not, of course, considered relatively to
other persons who might well have been joint owners. with him of
this right, without changing its character, but relatively to the
owner of the fee in the body of the land. If the right had been
held in common with him, it would, no doubt, have been held to
have been an incorporeal hereditament, without reference to the
paramount or absorbing character of the use.
And where this exclusiveness exists, it does not seem to matter
whether it is caused by the express words of the grant or by some
peculiar necessity of the use.
We ought, perhaps, not to pass to another topic without remark-
ing that, at one time, it was made a question whether such exclusive
rights could be granted; whether they must not necessarily and
for the sake- of congruity be in common with the owner of the
body of the soil: 1 Williams' Saunders, 351 and notes. But this
original difficulty seems not to have been long regarded. The
result of abandoning it was the very perplexing class of cases
already cited, or hereafter to be noticed.
Rights in the nature of easements may also be of the dignity of
a tenement when they are not only exclusive, but paramount and
engrossing.
In Le Fevre vs. Le Fevre, a right was given to the owner of one
lot of land to lay pipes, for the purpose of drainage, through
another's land, under a grant for that purpose. DuNcAN, J., says,
- I own the inclination of my mind is that an interest in the soil at
the given place passed, not only for laying the pipes, but for occu-
pying and possessing exclusively the spot designated by the grant."
4 S. & R. 244. See Jackson vs. Buel, 9 Johns. 299; .Kearick vs.
Kern, 14 S. & R. 271.
It would seem as if, where a right of way is, by the express
terms of the grant or by necessity, exclusive, and an absorbing
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use of the land, it would amount to a tenement, and be corporeal.
Thus, where a right of way is taken by a railroad, but its system
of police, to prevent accident, requires the part taken to be fenced
in, and persons and cattle, even the owner of the soil and his cattle,
to be excluded, the interest would appear to be corporeal: The
King vs. Joliffe, 2 T. R. 90; The King vs. Bell, 7 T. R. 598.
A burial lot, which the owner has an exclusive right to enclose,
cultivate, and ornament with flowers, may well be considered as
coming under the same head; and many other cases of exclusive
rights, apparently of a commonable character, or in the nature
of easements, might be mentioned as belonging to this class of
interests.
But even this necessity of absolute exclusiveness has not been
held, in all cases, to be requisite; or, at least, the exclusiveness
need not continue throughout the year.
In Ward vs. Petifer, the vicar's choral, in Litchfield, had
primam tonsuram of a meadow called the Parson's Hayn, from
the haying until the crop was mowed and carried away, and never
had other profit thereof; while it appeared Sir Edward Pite had
all the profits thereof for the rest of the year. In an ejectment
by the vicar's lessee, the court say, "c that properly, unless other
matter be shown to the contrary, the freehold is in him who hath
the first tonsure; for that is the most beneficial part of the year ;
and those who have the after-pasture, have but the profits in nature
of common; but admitting he hath but the first crop, yet they held
he may well have an ejectment thereof:" Oro. Car. 162.
In accordance with this new phase in the development of the
distinction between the corporeal and incorporeal, it was held in
the case already cited, of The King vs. Tolpuddle, that the interest
amounted to a tenement, and was corporeal, though the right to
pasture the cows was only exclusive for part of the year; while in
the case of The King vs. Churchll, a right, though exclusive, was
considered too short, and relatively too insignificant to give the
freehold: 4 B. & C. 750.
These cases establish, beyond a doubt, that there inay be a free-
hold in the tonsure, pasturage, mowage or herbage of land, and that
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this carries with it the right to enough of the soil to support it;
that this right or interest is a tenement which is recovered and
defended by actions of trespass and ejectment, but is still a free-
hold in the mere surface as distinguished from the body of the
earth.
With these cases before us, we may be pardoned for another
recurrence to the subject of the difficulties which they create in
respect of the common law division into corporeal and incorporeal;
and we shall, perhaps, be better understood after a few remarks
upon what is called an "estate."'
It is a word which is used in combination with others explaining
or applying it, to express the extent of an owner's right to use and
dispose of land. If we say a man has an estate for years, we
indicate the length or, as it is called, the quantity of the estate.
If we say he has an estate in an easement or common, we apply
the word to its subject.
The words ", estate for years" at once suggest certain doctrines
to the instructed mind, and the words "estate in a common,
certain other doctrines ; but are these classes of doctrines so widely
diverse as one would suppose ?
The words "c estate for years," when used with reference to the
admitted corporeal, the land itself, not only express an interest
which must terminate at a certain day, and which the tenant can-
not control for a longer period, but they suggest further a limit to
the modes of using and enjoying land. The physical control of
the tenant for years over land differs almost as much from that
of a tenant in fee, as the control of one who has a common of
pasture differs from that of a tenant for years. The latter has
most of the easements and commons of which the land is sus-
ceptible, and but little more. He cannot tear down or build ;-
he cannot open a mine or quarry ;-his right to cut or lop trees is
extremely limited ;-his very modes of ploughing and disposing of
1 We have already given one of Blackstone's definitions of this word. But ne
further says, "It is called in Latin status; it signifying the condition or circum-
stance in which the owner stands with regard to his property."
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manure are watched by the reversioner or remainder-man, who has
a most decided control over his movements.
And, showing how easily special restraints or regulations upon an
ordinary tenancy may perplex our arrangements of subjects, Mr.
Burton says, - It is seldom indeed that any doubt can arise as to
the corporeal nature of those concurrent interests which several per-
sons may have in the same land, as joint tenants, coparceners or
tenants in common, except, perhaps, where an ancient tenancy in
common has been subjected to some customary regulations as to
the mode of enjoyment, similar to those usual in commons of pas-
ture; which appears to be the case with what are called cattlegates
in Yorkshire." § 1159.
May not such regulations be made by agreement in modern
tenancies? Thus, if there be a conveyance of land to two joint
tenants or tenants in common by a deed to which all are parties,
and which not only secures the title to them, but defines their
mode of using the land relatively to each other, very serious ques-
tion might arise whether, under a conveyance of the soil to both,
one had not obtained a mere incorporeal.
By using words of conveyance, therefore, which have no refer-
ence whatever to the creation of any incorporeal hereditament, the
modes in which the tenant is to use the land may be as closely
defined and as much restrained as if words were used specially
directed to the creation of a common or'an easement.
And to take another and perhaps more disturbing view: where
words are used to indicate rights only of a commonable character
or in the nature of easements, incorporeals are sometimes not
created. The cases cited seem at least to establish these points.
To give a man exclusive right of pasture for life in a meadow which
is susceptible of no other use, is to give him a corporeal-a freehold
in the herbage or tonsure; and he may have a joint tenant of the
right without changing its nature. If one has such a right even
for the larger or better portion of the year, it is a corporeal, even
though the owner have the exclusive use the rest of the year.
If one has the primam tonsuram exclusively, and commons with the
owner all the rest of the year, the former has a freehold.
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Land is not like a personal chattel, of which one'can have actual
exhausting enjoyment. He can wear out a coat, drink up wine,
eat fruit, spend money, or take merchandise with him to a new
locality. Not so with the land. The proprietor can neither con-
sume it nor remove it. He may sell sand, or stone, or ore from off
it; but, practically, the land remains. It cannot be destroyed;
it cannot be brought into court; it cannot be delivered from hand
to hand; it cannot be actually seized by the sheriff. It is the
incorporeal interest in it alone which any man can have, or about
which there can be contention; and this incorporeal has as many
different aspects and modifications as the wit of man can devise.
Some of these modifications are presumed, as from the quality or
quantity of the estate, others are expressed; but they run in extent
or degree from the amplest to the most restricted use, without
allowing of any clear distinction, such as that based on the words
corporeal and incorporeal.
We now descend below the surface, and treat of the strata which
underlie it.
In Comyn vs. Kyneto, ejectment was brought for a coal mine.
It was objected that it did not lie because the coal mine was quod-
dam proficuum subtus solum, and an habere facias possessionem
could not be had thereof; but it was held to be well brought,
because the coal mine was a profit of which the law took cogni-
sauce, and the case of the boylarry of salt and another case of a
coal mine were cited: Cro. Jac. 150.
In Wilson vs. 31-ackreth, it was held, that an exclusive right of
digging peat in certain mosses was to be defended by an action of
trespass, vi et armis, and not by an action on the case: Burr.
1824.
In Humphries vs. Brogden, it was distinctly held, that there
may be different freeholds and different inheritances, being different
closes in different strata: 1 Eng. Law & Eq. 241. See also Harris
vs. Byding, 5 Al. & W. 60 ; Wilkinson vs. Proud, 11 M. & W. 33;
Soughton vs. Lea, I Taunt. 409; Bich vs. Johnson, 2 Strange
1142.
In Caldwell vs. Copeland, the court say, " The judge's language
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was, ' the actual possession of the surface carries with it the actual
possession downward, perpendicularly, through all the various
strata. The actual possession, therefore, was in the plaintiff.'
This proposition would be unquestionable, if there had not been a
severance of the title to the mine right from that of the surface,
by the deed of 27th May, 1831, Caldwell to Green. But it is not
true that after such a severance, whether by reservation or grant,
the possession of the surface is possession of the underlying mine-
ral. That mines may form a distinct possession and a different
inheritance from the surface land has been long settled in Eng-
land." " It is a common occurrence in mining districts there, not
only that the ownership of the soil is vested in one person and
that of the mines in another, but there are frequently distinct
owners of the minerals in the same land. Thus, one person may
be entitled to the iron ore-another to the limestone-a third to
one seam or stratum of coal, and a fourth to a distinct stratum.
Title to any one of these minerals, quite distinct from the title to
the surface, may be shown by documentary evidence; or, in the
absence of such evidence, or in opposition to it, title to them may
be made out by proof of possession, and acts of ownership, under
the statute of limitations. The acts of ownership, however, which
constitute possession and confer title, must be distinct from such
as are exercised over the surface." -So entirely is a mineral
right, after severance, a claim to land, and therefore not a corpo-
real hereditament, that title to it cannot be acquired by prescrip-
tion." 37 Pa. Rep. 430; Caldwell vs. Yukton-, 31 Pa. 482.
It may be asked, -how thin these strata may be, and whether
there may be a close or tenement in a single rock? We see no
limit, in theory, to the possible subdivisions that may be made.
Of course, if an owner of a stratum of sand, clay, rock or ore
digs it out and disposes of it, he makes it completely personalty,
as any owner has a right to do with any part of his land. A house
is realty,-an undoubted accession to the land,-but the owner has
a, right to take it down and sell its materials at his pleasure. The
character of the house, as realty, is completely destroyed, but no
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one uses this as an argument against the doctrine '.that the house,
while attached to the land, was a part of it.
When such rights in different strata of the earth are created, the
same difficulty arises as in reference to the herbage, in deciding
whether a corporeal or incorporeal interest is created ;-whether
the proprietor has a mere common or an exclusive tenement.
As a very fall and learned discussion of this question, in the
light of cases ancient as well as modern, by a judge well able to
discriminate, we refer to the decision in the case of Caldwell vs.
.Pulton, before cited. It would take more space than we can give
in such an essay to consider it. It depends generally upon the
terms of the grant in each case.
Of course, into the detailed doctrines of such a new sphere of
law as that which concerns these horizontal sections, we enter with
some uncertainty. It is but little developed by decision. The
cases do scarcely more than suggest difficulties.
We have already seen that Mr. Burton expresses a doubt whether
such an interest as that which results from having the exclusive
right to the herbage, lies in livery. And in the case of Wilkin8on
vs. Proud, we find that the argument suggests such remarks from
the bench as these: 4 PAKE, B.-It would be a matter of some
difficulty to make livery of a stratum of coal lying under the soil.
A communication might be made by digging down to it. ALDER-
SON, B.-Possibly a symbolical delivery on the surface of the land
might be sufficient."
And Mr. Burton says, c, And with respect to mines, it is clear
that they may be made the subject of ejectment, and of convey-
ance by livery, if actually opened; and that an interest in mines
unopened may exist, independently of any estate in the surface of
the land, which interest, until reduced into actual possession, so
far resembles a remainder as not to be liable to dower; and for
the same reason may, perhaps, be considered as lying in grant."
§ 1164.
So in the case of The King vs. Tolpuddle, already cited, Lord
KENYON says, c In order to make a. tenement it is not necessary
that the party should have the fee simple or the fee tail; any
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minute interest.in the land is parcel of a tenement. Such minute
interest, indeed, cannot be entailed, but all the parcels, where con-
solidated together, may."
Another judge in the same case says, " that it could not have
been entailed on account of the imbecility of the estate." If it
had been a perpetual interest he seems to think it could have been
entailed.
There is some confusion of expression here, and a possible doubt
as to its application. The words "minute interest," used by Lord
KENYON, appear to refer to the quantity of the estate, and not to
the thinness of the surface ; but all these doubts show the novelty
and difficulty of the subject.
Some of these difficulties are not regarded in this country, where
the tendency is to throw off the shackles of antique doctrine. In
Oaldwell vs. Futon, the court say, " Our English ancestors, indeed,
found difficulty in conceiving of a corporeal interest in an unopened
mine, separate from the ownership of the surface, because livery
of seisin was, in their minds, inseparable from a conveyance of
land, and livery could not be made of an unopened mine. The
consequence was that they were disposed to regard such rights as
incorporeal, though they are not rights issuing out of land, but the
substance itself. In this state, however, livery of seisin is supplied
by the deed and its registration, and there is nothing incongruous
in considering a grant of the substratum a grant of land, as much
as is a conveyance of the surface itself. It is often by far the most
valuable, and sometimes embraces all for which the land is worth
owning."
Questions have arisen as to the relative rights and duties of these
owners of houses, stories of houses, surfaces and strata above or
below each other.
In Erskine's Institutes of the Law of Scotland, from which we
-have already cited, it is said, "the proprietor of the ground floor
is bound merely by the nature and condition of his property, with-
out any servitude, not only to bear the weight of the upper story,
but to repair his own property that it may be capable of bearing
that weight." ", The proprietor of the ground story is obliged to
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uphold it for the support of the upper, and the owner of the upper
must uphold that as a roof or cover to the lower."
In Rumphries vs. Brogden, already referred to, the court say,
GC We have attempted, without success, to obtain from the codes
and jurists of other nations information and assistance respecting
the rights and obligations of persons to whom sections of the soil,
divided horizontally, belong, as separate properties. This penury,
where the subject of servitudes is so copiously and discriminatingly
treated, probably proceeds from the subdivision of the surface of
the land and the minerals under it into separate holdings, being
peculiar to England. Had such subdivision been known in countries
under the jurisdiction of the Roman civil law, its incidental rights
and duties must have been exactly defined, when we discover the
rights of adjoining proprietors of lands to support from lateral
pressure leading to such minute regulations," &c.
Since this case was decided, that of Haines vs. -7oberts is
reported, in which the duty of support, in such cases, is recognised
as a general common law right. 6 El. & Bl. 643; S. C. 7 El. &
Bl. 625.
This necessity of supporting the surface or an upper mine is well
understood and regarded among the miners in Pennsylvania. Per-
haps many of the rules of lateral support might be found pertinent
and applicable. But new and curious aspects of the question will,
some day, have to be provided for. There must be some measure
for the support which the lower proprietor must give, and of the
weight which- the owner of the surface may put upon it; and many
other points of relative duty and protection must be settled. It
is, perhaps, singular that so few decisions have been made on the
subject in this country, many parts of which, like Pennsylvania,
are so dependent upon mining interests. Most of the cases which
now make their way into the digests come from the courts of Cali-
fornia.
We hope to be able, at some future time, to pursue this subject
further. E. S. M.
